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Covering The Uninsured:What
Is ItWorth?
An attempt to place a value on what it costs a person, and society,
when health insurance is lacking.
by Wilhelmine Miller, Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor, and Willard G.
Manning
ABSTRACT: One out of six Americans under age sixty-five lacks health insurance, a situa-
tion that imposes sizable hidden costs upon society. The poorer health and shorter lives of
those without coverage account for most of these costs. Other impacts are manifested by
Medicare and disability support payments, demands on the public health infrastructure,
and losses of local health service capacity. We conclude that the estimated value of health
forgone each year because of uninsurance ($65–$130 billion) constitutes a lower-bound
estimate of economic losses resulting from the present level of uninsurance nationally.
D
ur ing the past quarter- century the rate of uninsurance for the
U.S. population under age sixty-five has remained relatively constant, fluc-
tuating between 15 and 18 percent. Our voluntary and predominantly
employment-based approach to coverage for the nonelderly population contrib-
utes to the persistence of this large pool of uninsured people. One reason policy-
makers have not acted to ensure universal coverage is that they have not appreci-
ated the costs of the status quo.
In a series of six reports, the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM’s) Committee on the
Consequences of Uninsurance weighed evidence about the adverse impacts of
uninsurance and, when possible, estimated the monetary value of these costs for
individuals, families, communities, and society overall.1 This paper presents the
economic cost analysis of the committee’s June 2003 report, Hidden Costs, Value Lost:
Uninsurance in America.
The Cost Of Uninsurance
Simply put, economic costs are the value of resources devoted to one purpose
that are not then available for alternative uses—the resources’ opportunity cost.
The IOM committee examined the resource costs that stem from the nation’s high
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rate of uninsurance from the most comprehensive perspective, that of society
overall. The societal perspective theoretically includes costs borne by all members
of society, including individuals, families, health care facilities, communities, and
other organizations. The societal perspective includes collective losses, such as di-
minished health services capacity in communities with relatively high rates of
uninsurance. Societal costs thus are much broader than governmental program
costs or private individual and institutional expenditures.
Probably the greatest cost of the lack of health insurance is the poorer health
and shorter lives of people without coverage. Conversely, the greatest benefit of
universal coverage would likely be the improvements in health and longevity
among those who otherwise would be uninsured. Throughout this paper, unless
otherwise defined, “cost” refers to resource losses that follow from the current
level of uninsurance in the United States. Worse health among the uninsured,
however, is only one of several adverse outcomes of the lack of health insurance
within a population. Lack of coverage also exposes people to financial risk and un-
certainty. Also, it can have deleterious spillover effects across a community, con-
tributing to the loss of certain kinds of health services, less effective control of
communicable disease, and losses to the local economic base.2
The consequences of uninsurance can be categorized as costs to private enti-
ties—including individuals, families, and firms—or as spillover costs that affect
society more generally (Exhibit 1). Some of these are true economic costs (such as
the worse health of those lacking coverage). Others, such as higher taxes or diver-
sion of public resources, are partially transfers among actors in the economy (for
example, some of the value of uncompensated care that hospitals and physicians
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EXHIBIT 1
Costs Consequent To Uninsurance
Internal or private costs
(for individuals, families, and firms) External or spillover costs
Greater morbidity and premature mortality
Developmental losses for children
Family financial uncertainty and stress, depletion of
assets (resource and transfer costs)
Lost income of uninsured breadwinner in ill health
Workplace productivity losses (absenteeism, reduced
efficiency on the job)
Diminished sense of social equality and self-respect
Diminished quality and availability of personal health
services
Diminished public health system capacity
Diminished population health (such as higher rates of
vaccine-preventable disease)
Higher taxes, budget cuts, loss of other uses for public
revenues diverted to uncompensated care (primarily
transfer costs, except for administrative costs)
Higher public program costs connected with worse
health (Medicare, disability payments) (primarily
transfer costs)
Diminished workforce productivity
Diminished social capital; unfulfilled social norms of
caring, equal opportunity, and mutual respect
SOURCE: Adapted from Institute of Medicine Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance, Hidden Costs, Value Lost:
Uninsurance in America (Washington: National Academies Press, 2003), 31, Figure 2.2.
provide to the uninsured) and are thus a matter of distribution rather than a cost.
In this paper we present our estimate of the value of health lost due to unin-
surance; contrast that value with an estimate of the additional investment in
health services that would remedy the worse health outcomes of those now unin-
sured; and then discuss other, mostly unquantified, economic costs. We conclude
by offering some reasons for the failure of private actions to achieve the societally
superior outcome of universal coverage, identifying limitations of the analysis, and
drawing some policy implications.
Valuing Health Outcomes
Perhaps the greatest cost to society of a large uninsured population is the in-
creased mortality and worse health of the uninsured. Because the value of health is
not easily derived from market prices, estimating this cost is challenging. Further-
more, health is multidimensional and thus difficult to define and measure. In addi-
tion to mortality, which is easy to measure, health encompasses physical and men-
tal well-being and functioning.
We use the concept of health capital to capture these aspects of health. Health
capital is analogous to human capital, a concept used in labor economics. Human
capital is “cashed out” as the present value of the income one can expect to receive
over the course of one’s life as a function of one’s stock of knowledge. Having a
better education allows a person to earn more in the future. Similarly, having more
health makes a person happier and longer lived. Health capital is the present value
of the utility resulting from a person’s expected lifetime stock of health.3
 Estimating health capital. Health capital accounts for the value that people
have for their lives and health beyond their future earnings. Estimating this value in-
volves collapsing the elements of health into a quality-adjusted life expectancy and
assigning this estimate a dollar value. To do this, we rate a person’s health-related
quality of life (HRQL) on a scale ranging from 0 (for death) to 1 (for perfect health).
Any diseases or impairments reduce this HRQL weight so it falls somewhere in the
0–1 range. A year in a health state with a particular HRQL weight is referred to as a
quality-adjusted life year (QALY).4 For any given year in the future, the expected
QALY is the sum of each probability that a person will have a particular disease pro-
file that year multiplied by the expected HRQL from having that set of diseases.
These expected QALYs are then discounted at a rate of 3 percent to their present val-
ues and summed to yield a quality-adjusted life expectancy.5
If there are only two possible health states, perfect health (HRQL = 1) and death
(HRQL = 0), then the expected QALY for a given year in the future is simply the
probability that a person is alive in that year. Summing these QALYs over all future
years without discounting yields remaining life expectancy. The measure of health
capital we use starts with this approach and incorporates discounting and health
states other than perfect health.
To incorporate morbidity into the measure of health capital, we used data on fif-
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teen chronic conditions from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and
the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) database. We calculated
the prevalence of these conditions by age and sex. Using an ordered probit model
with self-reported health as the dependent variable, we estimated QALY weights
for each condition. The coefficient on the variable indicating that a person has a
particular condition tells us how the presence of that condition moves one along
the scale of self-reported health, holding constant demographic characteristics
and other reported health conditions. These coefficients were then scaled to 0–1 to
yield the QALY weights.6 Life expectancy, disease prevalence, and QALY weights
were then combined as described above into a measure of discounted, quality-
adjusted life expectancy.
For the analysis in Hidden Costs, Value Lost, we monetized this estimate by multi-
plying the quality-adjusted life expectancy by the value of a year in perfect health.
A vast literature on the value of a statistical life (VSL) has developed in response to
government agencies’ need to evaluate the relative costs and benefits of health,
safety, and environmental regulation. The value of an individual life year has re-
ceived little attention, however.
 Valuing a life year. How much for a year of healthy life? Values of a life year
used in research and by government agencies vary widely. We use a value of
$160,000 for a year in perfect health based on a recent survey of VSL studies.7 This
value is derived from a subset of VSL studies that use a stated willingness-to-pay
methodology. This methodology uses surveys to measure a person’s willingness to
pay for a small reduction in the risk of death, which is then used to impute the im-
plied value of a life. According to economic theory, willingness to pay should cap-
ture the full value a person places on his or her life, incorporating both earnings and
the enjoyment of living itself.
Estimating willingness to pay is preferable to using a human capital approach,
which values a life at the discounted sum of all future earnings.8 The human capi-
tal approach ignores the undesirability (disutility) of poor health, except for
forgone earnings, and it does not factor in the value of time spent not working.
Thus, human capital underestimates the benefits of health gains.
Our value of a life year corresponds to a lifetime VSL of $4.8 million, assuming a
3 percent discount rate and a constant value for years over the life span. This is
within the range of VSL estimates reported in the literature. One comprehensive
review of the VSL literature produces a range of VSL estimates clustered between
$3.8 and $9 million.9 A recent meta-analysis of certain willingness-to-pay studies
finds a median VSL in the United States of $6.7 million.10 Our implied VSL is also
consistent with the range of values used by government agencies.11
Recent studies that have used the value of a life year to measure benefits have
used a wide range of estimates. One “rule of thumb” value of a statistical life year
frequently cited in studies of clinical outcomes is $100,000; however, this is out-
dated and is not based on a systematic review of the literature.12 The U.S. Environ-
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mental Protection Agency (EPA) has used a value of $172,000 per life year for peo-
ple under age age sixty-five and $434,000 for people over age sixty-five in several
recent analyses, and this approach has been endorsed by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB).13 Unlike the EPA, we use a constant value of a life year
regardless of age, sex, race or ethnicity, educational attainment, or income. We do
this for equity reasons and because little is known about how the value of a life
year varies across individuals and over the life span.14
 Measuring differences in health capital. The value of health forgone be-
cause of uninsurance is measured as the difference in health capital between the in-
sured and the uninsured. Ideally, all differences between these groups that affect
health outcomes—other than insurance status—should be factored out of the anal-
ysis. In practice, this is difficult. Unobserved factors may account for effects attrib-
uted to having or lacking health insurance. Based on its previous systematic review
of outcomes studies, the IOM committee concluded that attributing an excess mor-
tality risk of 25 percent to the uninsured population ages 1–65 was reasonable.15 An
independent review of the health outcomes literature supports this assumption.16
More recent longitudinal analyses comparing mortality outcomes for insured and
uninsured populations are beginning to be reported, and they should soon support
better estimates of the relative mortality risks of these groups.17
It was not possible, with our cross-sectional data, to estimate the true differ-
ence in morbidity by insurance status. Thus, two sets of analyses bound the esti-
mates. First, we assumed that there was no difference in morbidity by insurance
status. The effect of insurance on health capital using this approach reflects only
the mortality differential. This provides a lower bound. In the second scenario, we
assumed that the entire measured difference in health was attributable to insur-
ance status. Because some unmeasured characteristics that correlate with insur-
ance status are likely, this estimate provides an upper bound of the possible gains
in health from insuring the uninsured.
We found that the average uninsured person forgoes between $1,645 and $3,280
of health capital for each year without insurance coverage. These estimates vary by
age and sex. In the aggregate, for roughly forty million uninsured Americans, we
estimate the value of health forgone per year without coverage at $65–$130 billion.
This range reflects our lower- and upper-bound approaches, but it still involves
considerable uncertainty. However, while different assumptions could yield
higher or lower estimates, the assumptions used should produce conservative esti-
mates. For example, the analysis assumes no permanent adverse impacts to health
as a result of any previous spells of uninsurance. At any given age, adverse events
prior to that age do not affect future health. Thus, we do not take into account po-
tential gains to individuals, Medicare, or subsequent private insurers from elimi-
nating persistent health problems from the previously uninsured. We also assume
that a person faces the average probability of being uninsured at a given age as it
existed in 2000–2001, while rates of uninsurance are on an upward trend.
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Remedying The Health Deficit Of Uninsured Americans
What would it cost to eliminate the differences in health care use between in-
sured and uninsured people who are otherwise similar (and thus improve the
health outcomes of the uninsured)? Economists Jack Hadley and John Holahan es-
timated the net (new) societal costs of providing uninsured Americans with the
kind and amount of health care used by those with either public coverage (princi-
pally Medicaid) or private insurance.18 Their simulation of the projected health
care spending if the currently uninsured U.S. population were insured produced
net new annual costs in 2001 dollars of $34 billion–$69 billion, with public or pri-
vate coverage, respectively.19 Other simulations have produced incremental cost
estimates for providing the uninsured population with an “insured” level of health
care that fall within this range.20
These estimates assume nothing about the efficiency or appropriateness of the
care used by publicly or privately insured populations; they include any excess or
inappropriate use that having coverage could promote and thus represent upper
bounds on the additional service costs of achieving the health benefits of coverage.
Therefore, the social investment required to extend an insured level of health care
to the uninsured is likely to produce gains in better health and longevity (valued at
$65–$130 billion annually) well in excess of the incremental societal costs of in-
creased use of services.
Other Costs Of Uninsurance
In addition to economic losses resulting from the worse health of the uninsured,
uninsurance has several other effects that have not been well documented and are
difficult to quantify. We review these briefly below.
 Financial risk and uncertainty. Lack of coverage increases the unpredictabil-
ity of medical expenses and the potential for financial catastrophe, including bank-
ruptcy. The social stigma and psychological stresses of medical indigency, health
care debt, and bill collection efforts are themselves burdensome.21 Financial plan-
ning is problematic for families with uninsured members, who face uncertain but
potentially great liability for future medical expenses. Even for the majority of
Americans who have coverage, maintaining it is not a sure thing, and the prospect of
losing it can cause anxiety.
Overall, the uninsured spend much less on health care than comparable people
with coverage spend. However, uninsured individuals and families pay a larger
share of their health care expenses (excluding premium payments) out of pocket
than those who have coverage, and uninsured families are more likely than insured
families to have high out-of-pocket expenses as a proportion of family income.22
Despite the financial burden imposed by lack of coverage, the estimated value of
the financial risk protection that health insurance would have for currently unin-
sured people is surprisingly low. This follows from the fact that the uninsured pay
for just 7 percent of the cost of any hospital services they use.23 This pure insurance
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value of coverage, the risk premium, is calculated as a function of the reduction in
the variability of expected expenditures that having coverage achieves. Because
incurred expenses for hospital and other high-cost care for the most part go un-
paid by uninsured patients, the variance in actual out-of-pocket health spending
within the uninsured population is low. These incurred but unpaid bills are ab-
sorbed as bad debt or count as charity care, and they are financed largely by the
federal, state, and local governments through institutional operating subsidies.24
A working group of the IOM committee estimated that the annual value of the risk
premium for the currently uninsured population is $40–$80 per capita, or roughly
$1.6–$3.2 billion for forty million uninsured people.25
 Spillover costs. We have not been able to assign dollar values to the spillover
costs or measure the distributional impact (that is, transfer costs) of the current
rates of uninsurance. The information needed to determine the impact of unin-
surance on public expenditures, on the commercial economies of communities, and
on the U.S. social and political climate has not been collected. Other spillover effects
include diversion of public health resources, reduced availability of primary and spe-
cialty health care services, and diminished economic vitality.26
Three areas of public spending—Medicare, disability income and medical care
support, and criminal justice—bear some degree of excess costs because of the less
appropriate care and worse health of the uninsured.
Medicare. Medicare ensures virtually universal coverage of the population age
sixty-five and older. Little research to date has looked at how use of Medicare ben-
efits might differ between previously insured and previously uninsured beneficia-
ries. Some researchers hypothesize that previously uninsured beneficiaries are
sicker and thus use services more intensively once they are enrolled in Medicare
than do those who have been continuously insured.27
Disability. To the extent that the lack of coverage contributes to the development
of disabling health conditions and claims for disability income support, some of
the cost of disability determination, benefits administration, and the behavioral
responses to taxes financing the payments can be attributed to uninsurance.
Mental illness. Adults with severe mental illnesses (such as schizophrenia or bi-
polar disorder) are uninsured at a rate comparable to that of all adults under age
sixty-five: 20 percent. Those who lack coverage are less likely to receive appropri-
ate, ongoing treatment. Untreated people with these mental illnesses are more
likely to manifest behavior that lands them in jail or prison.28 Incarcerating people
with psychotic symptoms is costly and therapeutically inappropriate. Perversely,
however, someone with a severe mental illness is more likely to receive specialized
mental health services once he or she comes in contact with the criminal justice
system than before.29 Continuous coverage for people with severe mental illness,
by increasing the likelihood of appropriate treatment, could reduce justice system
costs and provide greater public order and safety.
V a l u e O f C o v e r a g e
H E A LT H A F F A I R S ~ W e b E x c l u s i v e W 4 - 1 6 3
Why Haven’t Private Choices Eliminated Uninsurance?
If universal coverage offers superior economic value, why has our society not
achieved it? If having health insurance improves health and extends life, and if pro-
ductivity increases as a result, why are not all businesses willing to purchase—or
why does not every employee demand—health insurance? Importantly, our analy-
sis divorces the value of health insurance for the uninsured, measured as gains in
health capital, from people’s ability to pay for coverage out of their incomes. This
choice reflects the IOM committee’s ethical judgment that healthy years of life
should be valued equally for all members of society. Building equity into the calcu-
lation of benefits from coverage also implies the need for a collective solution.
As for individuals and family decisionmakers, employees may prefer higher
wages over health coverage. The trade-off between wages and benefits is most
stark for workers with low incomes: More than 40 percent of full-time workers
who earn less than $10,000 annually are uninsured, whereas just 5 percent of those
earning more than $50,000 remain uninsured.30 In addition, not everyone antici-
pates financial benefits from having health insurance, and some then forgo the
spreading of risk that insurance provides.
From the employer perspective, high job turnover rates may discourage em-
ployers’ investments in their employees’ health. Nearly 20 percent of employees
were on the job for less than a year in 1996.31 Long-duration employment has been
declining more rapidly for less educated workers, the group at greatest risk of be-
ing uninsured and of becoming unemployed and thus losing coverage. Employers
may also underinvest in the health of their employees if part of the benefit occurs
as changes in morbidity and mortality after retirement. Those benefits and cost re-
ductions accrue to the individual and to Medicare, but not to the firm.
The costs and benefits of health insurance are so fragmented and variable that
even within the class of employers or that of workers, the net benefit of coverage
that occurs in the aggregate may not be realized by the subgroup. To the extent
that private (individual or employer) gains are less than private costs, this contrib-
utes to underinvestment by both employer and employee. Similarly, the individual
may not be willing to invest in health insurance because he or she may not be
aware of its expected benefits to health.
Limitations Of This Analysis
Although this analysis of the economic costs of uninsurance takes a broader
view of costs related to the lack of coverage, it provides only part of the picture
needed for delineating the implications of any policy alternative that achieves uni-
versal coverage. Some parts of the picture still need to be filled in.
First, evaluating the economic cost impacts from the point of view of society re-
veals little about the distributive effects of universal health insurance coverage rel-
ative to the status quo. We do know that those who would otherwise be unin-
sured would be the primary beneficiaries of their own improved health and that
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this improved health and longevity has substantial economic value. The incidence
of new economic costs attributable to greater use of health care by the previously
uninsured, as well as the shifts in financing affecting current sponsors of uncom-
pensated care, cannot be projected in the absence of a specific proposal.
Second, this analysis does not encompass all aspects of health care finance that
affect systemwide costs. It does not consider public subsidies to health insurance
coverage (the deductibility of health insurance premium payments from income
taxes), which amount to $120–$160 billion annually.32 Neither does it address the
administrative and allocative inefficiencies of current financing mechanisms.33
Third, our results depend on several strong underlying assumptions and
choices, such as the discount rate, the value of a healthy life year, and the construc-
tion of the QALY weights. Further, the observed difference in health outcomes be-
tween the insured and uninsured may be affected by unmeasured differences be-
tween these groups that will not change when the uninsured gain coverage.34
Finally, we have relatively crude measures of uninsurance and of its effects on
health. For example, we do not know how length of time without coverage or how
sporadic coverage affects health. While information about patterns of coverage
and periods of uninsurance is improving, rarely is it related to information about
health outcomes.35
Policy Implications
This analysis of the societal costs of uninsurance is a first attempt to take a com-
prehensive look at the opportunity costs of our nation’s patchwork, voluntaristic
approach to health insurance that leaves so many without coverage. While sizable
gaps in information remain to be filled, the initial effort of the IOM committee rec-
ommends a structure and scope for subsequent economic analyses. Researchers
and policymakers are coming late to calculating the human and financial costli-
ness of business as usual in health coverage policy. Our ignorance is as much a re-
sult of not asking the right questions as it is of the inadequacy of data and of the
available explanatory models for health and productivity outcomes.
The political implications of endemic uninsurance in the United States are elu-
sive but vital to our strength and well-being as a nation. Because uninsured people
are less likely than those with coverage to receive effective and appropriate health
care, the resulting gap between the health outcomes of people who have coverage
and those who do not exacerbates disparities in health status across society.36
These disparities, and the difficulties that those who lack health insurance have in
obtaining appropriate and respectful care, undermine deeply rooted ideals of
equality of opportunity and equality of respect in the U.S. political culture.
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“The political implications of endemic uninsurance in the United
States are elusive but vital to our well-being as a nation.”
Policymakers at all levels of government are understandably concerned with
reconciling program spending with revenues collected. Federal policymakers in
particular, however, should supplement their customary budgetary view to take
in the full picture of the societal costs and benefits of alternative national coverage
scenarios. This broader perspective will demonstrate that an investment in uni-
versal coverage is very much worth making.
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